Modeling and verifying real-world cyber-physical systems are challenging, especially so for complex systems where manually modeling is infeasible. In this work, we report our experience on combining model learning and abstraction refinement to analyze a challenging system, i.e., a real-world Secure Water Treatment (SWAT) system. Given a set of safety requirements, the objective is to either show that the system is safe with a high probability (so that a system shutdown is rarely triggered due to safety violation) or otherwise. As the system is too complicated to be manually modelled, we apply latest automatic model learning techniques to construct a set of Markov chains through abstraction and refinement, based on two long system execution logs (one for training and the other for testing). For each probabilistic property, we either report it does not hold with a certain level of probabilistic confidence, or report that it holds by showing the evidence in the form of an abstract Markov chain. The Markov chains can subsequently be implemented as runtime monitors in SWAT. This is the first case study of applying model learning techniques to a real-world system as far as we know.
Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are ever more relevant to people's daily life. Examples include power supply which is controlled by smart grid systems, water supply which is processed from raw water by a water treatment system, and health monitoring systems. CPS often have strict safety and reliability requirements. However, it is often challenging to formally analyze CPS since they exhibit a tight integration of software control and physical processes. Modeling CPS is a major obstacle which hinders many system analysis techniques like model checking and model-based testing.
The Secure Water Treatment testbed (SWaT 1 ) built at Singapore University of Technology and Design [3] is a scale-down version of an industry water treatment plant in Singapore. The testbed is built to facilitate research on cyber security for CPS, which has the potential to be adopted to Singapore's water treatment systems. SWaT consists of a modern six-stage process. The process begins by taking in raw water, adding necessary chemicals to it, filtering it via an Ultrafiltration (UF) system, de-chlorinating it using UV lamps, and then feeding it to a Reverse Osmosis (RO) system. A backwash process cleans the membranes in UF using the water produced by RO. The cyber portion of SWaT consists of a layered communications network, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation, and a Historian. Data from sensors is available to the SCADA system and recorded by the Historian for subsequent analysis. There are 6 PLCs in the system, each of which monitors one stage using a set of sensors embedded in the relevant physical plants and controls the physical plants according to predefined control logics. SWaT has a strict set of safety requirements (e.g., the PH value of the water coming out of SWaT must be within certain specific range). In order to guarantee that the safety requirements are not violated, SWaT is equipped with safety monitoring devices which trigger a pre-defined shutdown sequence. Our objective is thus to show that the probability of a safety violation is low and thus SWaT is reliable enough to provide its service.
One approach is to develop a model of SWAT and then apply techniques like model checking. Such a model would have a discrete part which models the PLC control logic and a continuous part which models the physical plants (e.g., in the form of differential equations). Such an approach is challenging since SWAT has multiple chemical processes. For example, the whole process is composed of pre-treatment, ultrafiltration and backwash, de-chlorination, reverse osmosis and output of the processed water. The pre-treatment process alone includes chemical dosing, hydrochloric dosing, pre-chlorination and salt dosing. Due to the complexity in chemical reactions, manual modeling is infeasible. Furthermore, even if we are able to model the system using modeling notations like hybrid automata [13] , the existing tools/methods for analyzing such complicated hybrid models are limited.
An alternative approach which does not require manual modeling is statistical model checking (SMC) [31, 17, 10] . The main idea is to observe sample system executions and apply standard techniques like hypothesis testing to estimate the probability that a give property is satisfied. SMC however is not ideal for two reasons. First, SMC treats the system as a black box and does not provide any clue if a given property is satisfied. Second, SMC requires sampling the system many times, whereas starting/restarting real-world CPS like SWAT many times is not viable.
Recently, there have been multiple proposals on applying model learning techniques to automatically 'learn' system models from system executions and then analyze the learned model using techniques like model checking. A variety of learning algorithms have been proposed (e.g., [25, 24, 7, 22] ), some of which require only a few system executions. These approaches offer an alternative way of obtaining models, when having a model of such complex systems is a must. For instance, in [20, 9, 30, 29] , it is proposed to learn a probabilistic model first and then apply Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) to calculate the probability of satisfying a property based on the learned model.
It is however far from trivial to apply model learning directly on SWAT. Existing model learning approaches have only been applied to a few small benchmark systems. It is not clear whether they are applicable or scalable to actual systems like SWAT . In particular, there are many sensors in SWAT , many of which are float or double. As a result, the sensor readings induce an 'infinite' alphabet which immediately renders many model learning approaches infeasible. In fact, existing model learning approaches have rarely discussed the problem of data abstraction, with the exception of the LAR method [29] , which proposes a method of combining model learning and abstraction/refinement. However, LAR requires many system executions as input, which is infeasible in SWAT . In this work, we adopt and extend the LAR method so that it only has two long sequences of system execution logs (one for training and the other for testing) as input. We successfully 'verified' most of the properties for SWAT this way. For each property, we either report that the property is violated with a certain confidence, or report that the property is satisfied, in which case we output a model in the form of an abstract Markov chain as evidence. Note that in practice these models could be implemented as runtime monitors in SWAT . As far as we know, this is the first real-world application of model learning techniques to analyze CPS systems like SWAT.
The remainders of the paper are organized as follows. Sec. 2 presents background on SWAT, our objectives as well as some preliminaries. Sec. 3 details our learning approach. We present the results in Sec. 4 and conclude with related work in Sec. 5.
Background
In this section, we present the target SWAT system and state our motivation and goals.
System Overview
The system under analysis is the Secure Water Treatment (SWAT) built at the iTrust Center in Singapore University of Technology and Design [21] . It is a testbed system which scales down but fully realized the functions of a modern water treatment system in cities like Singapore. It enables researchers to better understand the principles of cyber-physical Systems (CPS) and further develop and experiment with smart algorithms to mitigate potential threats and guarantee its safety and reliability.
SWAT takes raw water as input and executes a series of treatment and output recycled water eventually. The whole process contains 6 stages as shown in Figure 1 . The raw water is taken to the raw water tank (P1) and then pumped to the chemical tanks. After a series of chemical dosing and a static mixer (P2), the water is filtered by an Ultrafiltration (UF) system (P3) and UV lamps (P4). It is then fed to a Reverse Osmosis (RO) system (P5) and a backwash process cleans the membranes in UF using the water produced by RO (P6). For each stage, a set of sensors are employed to monitor the system state. Meanwhile, a set of actuators controlled by the programming logic controller (PLC) are built in to manipulate the state of a physical process. The readings of sensors are collected and sent periodically to the PLC, while the PLC returns a set of actuators values according to the control logics and the current sensor values. For instance, the sensor LIT 101 is used to monitor the water level of the Raw Water Tank. The PLC reads its value and decides whether to set a new value to the actuators. For example if LIT 101 is beyond a threshold, the PLC may deactivate the valve M V 101 to stop adding water into the tank.
SWAT has many built-in safety mechanisms enforced in PLC. Each stage is controlled by local dual PLCs with approximately hundreds of lines of code. In case one PLC fails, the other PLC takes over. The PLC inspects the received and cached sensor values and decides the control strategy to take. Notice that the sensor values are accessible across all PLCs. For example, the PLC of tank 1 may decide whether to start pump P 101 according to the value of LIT 301, i.e., the water level of tank 3. In case the controller triggers potential safety violations of the system according to the current values of the sensors, the controller may shut down the system to ensure the safety. The system then needs to wait for further inspection from technicians or experts. Shutting down and restarting SWAT however is highly non-trivial, which takes significant costs in terms of both time and resource, especially in the real-world scenario. Thus, instead of asking whether a safety violation is possible, the question becomes: how often a system shutdown is triggered due to potential safety violation?
In total, SWAT has 25 sensors (for monitoring the status) and 26 actuators (for manipulating the plants). Each sensor is designed to operate in certain safe range. If a sensor value is out of the range, the system may take actions to adjust the state of the actuators so that the sensor values would go back to normal. Table 1 shows all the sensors in the 6 plants, their operation ranges, and the control points where actions are taken. The sensors has 3 categories distinguished by their prefixes. For instance, AIT xxx stands for Analyzer Indicator/Transmitter; DP IT xxx stands for Differential Pressure Indicator/Transmitter; F IT xxx stands for Flow Indicator Transmitter; LIT xxx stands for Level Indicator/Transmitter. SWAT is also equipped with a historian which records detailed system execution log, including all sensor readings and actuator status. Table 2 shows a truncated system log with part of sensors. Each row is the sensor readings at a time point and each row is collected every millisecond. Notice that different sensors may have different collection period. The table is filled such that a sensor keeps its old value if no new value is collected, e.g., AIT 202 in Table 2 . A dataset of SWAT has been published by the iTrust lab in Singapore University of Technology and Design [2]. The dataset contains the execution log of 11 consecutive days (i.e., 7 days of normal operations and another 4 days of the system being under various kind of attacks [2]). Objectives As discussed above, each sensor reading is associated with a safe range, which constitutes a set of safety properties (i.e., reachability). We remark that we focus on safety properties concerning the stationary behavior of the system in this work, rather than those properties concerning the system initializing or shutting down phase. In general, a stationary safety property takes the following form: the probability that a sensor is out of range (either too high or too low) is below a threshold. Our objective is to 'verify' whether a given set of stationary properties are satisfied or not. Manual modeling of SWAT is infeasible, with 6 water tanks interacting with each other, plenty of chemical reactions inside the tanks and dozens of valves controlling the flow of water. A group of experts from Singapore's Public Utility Board have attempted to model SWAT manually but failed after months of effort because the system is too complicated. We remark that without a system model, precisely verifying the system is impossible. As discussed above, while statistical model checking (SMC) is another option to provide a statistical measure on the probability that a safety property is satisfied, it is infeasible in our setting.
Thus, in this work, we aim to verify the system by means of model learning. That is, given a safety property, either we would like to show that the property is violated with certain level of confidence. Or we would like to show that the properties is satisfied with certain evidence. Ideally, the evidence is in the form of a small abstract model, at the right level-of-abstraction, which could be easily to be shown to satisfy the property. The advantage of presenting the model as the evidence is that the model could LIT 101 >1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 be further validated using additional data or through expert review. Furthermore, the models can serve other purposes. First, the models could be implemented as runtime monitors to detect potential safety violations at runtime. We could also predict future safety violation by predictive analysis based on the model and take early actions.
Our approach
We surveyed existing model learning algorithms (for the purpose of system verification through model checking) and found that most existing model learning approaches [20, 9, 30] are inapplicable in our setting. The reason is that the real-typed (float or double) variables in SWAT lead to infinite state space. We thus adopt a recently proposed model learning approach called LAR (short for learning, abstraction and refinement) documented in [29] , which allows us to abstract sensor readings in SWAT and automatically learn models at a proper level of abstraction based on a counterexample guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) framework. However, LAR was designed to take many independent execution logs as input whereas we have only a few long system logs of SWAT . We thus extend LAR to sLAR which learns system models from a single long system log instead. In the following, we briefly explain how sLAR works. Interested readers are referred to [29] for the detailed explanation of LAR.
Our overall approach is shown in Fig. 2 . Given a training log and a safety property, we first construct an abstract log and use a learner to learn a model based on the abstract log. Then, the safety property is verified against the learned model. If the verification returns true, we report true and output the learned model as evidence. Otherwise, we test the property by a validator on the testing log. If the validator finds that the property is violated, we report safety violation together with the level of confidence we achieve. Otherwise, we use a refiner to refine the abstraction and start over from the learner. Although sLAR is based on LAR, our goal of this case study is to verify stationary properties of SWAT and construct a stationary probabilistic model from one single long system log, which is different from LAR. Consequently, the procedures to verify the property and validate the result of the verifier are different. In the following, we present each part of our approach in details. 
The model
From an abstract point of view, SWAT is a system which is composed of n variables (including sensors, actuators as well as those variable in the PLC control program) which capture the system status. A system observation σ is the valuation of all variables at a time point t. A system log L = σ t0 σ t1 · · · σ t k is a sequence of system observations collected from time point t 0 to t k . Given a system log L, we write L(t) = σ t to denote the system observation at time t and L p (t) to denote the system observations before t, i.e., from t 0 to t. In this case study, we use L and L t to denote the training log and testing log respectively. We also use T 1 and T 2 to denote their lasting time respectively.
Several machine learning algorithms exist to learn a stationary system model from a single piece of system log [9, 24, 30] . However, applying these algorithms directly is infeasible because of the real-type variables in SWAT, since system observations at different time points are almost always different and thus the input alphabet for the learning algorithms is 'infinite'. To overcome this problem, our first step is to abstract the system log through predicate abstraction [27] . Essentially, a predicate is a Boolean expression over the set of variables. Given a system log and a set of predicates, predicate abstraction turns the concrete variable values to a bit vector where each bit represents whether the corresponding predicate is true or false. For example, given a predicate LIT 101 > 1100, the concrete system log on the left of Table 2 becomes the abstract system log on the right.
The models we learn from the log are in the form of discrete-time Markov Chains (DTMC), which is a widely used formalism for modeling stochastic behaviors of complex systems. Given a finite set of states S, a probability distribution over S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] such that s∈S µ(s) = 1. Let Distr (S) be the set of all distributions over S. Formally, Definition 1. A DTMC M is a tuple S, ı init , P r , where S is a countable, nonempty set of states; ı init : S → [0, 1] is the initial distribution s.t. s∈S ı init (s) = 1; and P r : S → Distr (S) is a transition function such that P r(s, s ) is the probability of transiting from state s to state s .
In our setting, we use a special form of DTMC, called stationary DTMC (written as sDTMC) to model the system behavior in the long run. Compared to a DTMC, an sDTMC has no prior initial distribution over the states.
Definition 2. An sDTMC is a tuple M = S, P r , where S is a finite set of states; and P r : S → Distr (S) is a transition function such that P r(s, s ) is the probability of transiting from state s to state s .
We denote a path starting with s 0 by π s0 = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n , which is a sequence of states in M, where P r(s i , s i+1 ) > 0 for every 0 ≤ i < n. we write P(π, M) = P r(s 0 , s 1 ) × P r(s 1 , s 2 ) × · · · × P r(s n−1 , s n ) to denote the probability of exhibiting π s0 in M. Furthermore, we write Path s f in (M) to denote the set of finite paths of M starting with s. We say that s j ∈ π s0 if s j occurs in π s0 .
Definition 3. An sDTMC is irreducible if for every pair of states s i , s j ∈ S , there exists a path π si such that s j ∈ π si .
Intuitively, an sDTMC is irreducible if there is path between every pair of states. For an irreducible sDTMC, there exists a unique probability distribution which describes the average time a chain spends in each state in the long run.
Definition 4. Let µ j denote the long run proportion of time that the chain spends in state s j : µ j = lim n→∞ 1 n n m=1 I{X m = s j |X 0 = s i } with probability 1., for all states s i . If for each s j ∈ S, µ j exists and is independent of the initial state s i , and sj ∈S µ j = 1, then the probability distribution µ = (µ 0 , µ 1 , · · · ) is called the limiting or stationary or steady-state distribution of the Markov chain.
In this work, we 'learn' a stationary and irreducible sDTMC to model the long term behavior of SWAT . By computing the steady-state distribution of the learned sDTMC, we can obtain the probability that the system is in the states of interests in the long run.
Learning Algorithm
After predicate abstraction, the training log becomes a series of bit vectors, which is applicable for learning. We then apply an existing learning algorithm in [24] to learn a stationary system model. The learned model is in the form of a Probabilistic Suffix Automata (PSA) as shown in Figure 3 , where a system state in the model is identified by a finite history of previous system observations. A PSA is an sDTMC. Each state in a PSA is labeled by a finite memory of the system. The transition function between the states are defined based on the state labels such that there is a transition s × σ → t iff l(t) is a suffix of l(s) · σ, where l(s) is the string label of s. A walk on the underlying graph of a PSA will always end in a state labeled by a suffix of the sequence. Given a system log L p (t) at t, a unique state in the PSA can be identified by matching the state label with the suffixes of L p (t). For example, · · · 010 is in state labeled by 0 and if we observe 1 next, the system will go to state labeled by 01.
To learn a PSA, we first construct an intermediate tree representation called Probabilistic Suffix Tree (PST), namely tree(L) = (N, root, E) where N is the set of suffixes of L; root = ; and there is an edge (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ E if and only if π 2 = e · π 1 . Based on different suffixes of the execution, different probabilistic distributions of the next observation will be formed. The center question is how deep should we grow the PST. A deeper tree indicates a longer memory to look at to predict the distribution of the next Fig. 3 : An example stationary model. The left is the PST representation, where each state is associated with a label and a distribution of the next observation. The right is the corresponding PSA model.
Algorithm 1: Learn P ST
1: Initialize T to be a single root node representing ; 2: Let S = {σ|f re(σ, α) > } be the candidate suffix set; 3: while S is not empty do 4:
Take any π from S; Let π be the longest suffix of π in T ; 5:
(B) If fre(π, α) · σ∈Σ Pr (π, σ) · log Pr (π,σ) Pr (π ,σ) ≥ add π and all its suffixes which are not in T to T ; 6:
(C) If fre(π, α) > , add e · π to S for every e ∈ Σ if fre( e · π, α) > 0; 7: end while observation. The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The tree keeps growing if adding children to a current leaf leads to a significant change (measured by K-L divergence) in the probability distribution of next observation (line 5). After we obtain the PST, we transform it into a PSA by taking the leafs as states and define transitions by suffix matching. An example PST and its corresponding PSA after transformation is given in Fig. 3 . Readers are referred to [24] for details.
Verification
Once we learn an sDTMC model, we then check whether the learned model satisfies the given safety property. To do so, we first compute the steady-state distribution of the learned model. There are several methods we could use for the calculation including power methods, solving equations or finding eigenvector [5] . The steady-state distribution tells the probability that a state occurs in the long run. With the steady-state distribution, we could obtain the probability that the system violates the safety property in the long run by summing up the steady-state probability of all unsafe states. Assume µ is the steady-state distribution, S u is the set of unsafe states in the learned model and P u is the probability that the system is in unsafe states in the long run. We calculate the probability of unsafe states as P u = si∈Su µ{s i }. We then check whether the learned model satisfies the safety property by comparing whether P u is beyond the safety threshold r. Take the PSA model in Figure 3 as example. The steady-state distribution over states [0, 01, 11] is [0.4, 0.31, 0.29]. States 01 and 11 are unsafe states. The probability that the system is in unsafe states is thus 0.6.
The verification generates two kinds of results. One is that P u is below the threshold r, which means the learned model under current abstraction level satisfies the safety requirement. Then, we draw the conclusion that the system is 'safe' and present the learned model as evidence. The soundness of the result can be derived if the abstract learned model simulates the actual underlying model [14] . However, since the model is obtained through model learning, it is not guaranteed that the result is sound. Yet, the model can be further investigated by validating it against future system logs or reviewed by experts. The other result is that the learned model does not satisfy the safety requirement, i.e., the probability of the system is in an unsafe state in the steadystate is larger than the threshold. In such a case, we move to the next step to validate whether the safety violation is introduced by abstraction [29] or not.
Abstraction Refinement
Spuriousness Checking In case we learn a model which shows that the probability of the system being in unsafe states in long term is beyond the safety threshold, we move on to validate whether the system is indeed unsafe or the violation is due to too coarse abstraction. For validating, we make use of a testing log which is obtained independently and compute the probability of the system being in unsafe states, which is denoted by P t u . The testing log has the same format with the training log. We estimate P t u by calculating the frequency that the system is in some unsafe states in the testing log. If P t u is larger than the threshold r, we report the safety violation together with a confidence by calculating the p-value [26] . Otherwise, we conclude that the violation is caused by too coarse abstraction and move to the next step to refine the abstraction.
Let N be the total number of states, and n be the number of unsafe states in the testing log. Let Y = X 1 + X 2 + · · · + X N , where X i is a Bernoulli random variable on whether a state is unsafe. The p−value is then calculated as α = 1 − P{Y ≥ n|P u < r}. For example, for property LIT 101 > 1000, if we observe 1009 times (n) that LIT 101 is larger than 1000 and the total length of the testing log is 100000 (N), then the estimated P t u is 1009/100000 = 0.01009. If we conclude that the current abstraction is too coarse, we continue to refine the abstraction by generating a new predicate following the approach in [29] . The predicate is then added to the set of predicates to obtain a new abstract system log based on the new abstraction. The algorithm then starts over to learn a new model based on the new abstract log. Next, we introduce how to generate a new predicate in our setting.
Finding spurious transitions A spurious transition in the learned model is a transition whose probability is inflated due to the abstraction. Further, a transition (s i , s j ) is spurious if the probability of observing s i transiting to s j in the actual system P M (s i , s j ) is actually smaller than P M P (s i , s j ) in the learned model [29] . Without the actual system model, we estimate the actual transition probability based on the testing log. Given the learned model M P and the testing log L t , we count the number of observing s i Algorithm 2: Algorithm CountST (M P , L t ) 1: Augment each transition (si, sj) in MP with a number #(si, sj) recording how many times we observe such a transition in Lt and initialize them to 0; 2: Let t0 be the first time that suf f ix(Lt(t0)) matches a label of a state in MP and a time pointer t = t0; 3: while t < T2 do 4:
Refer to MP for the current state st; 5:
Take Lt(t + 1) from Lt and refer to MP to get the next state st+1; 6:
Add #(st, st+1) by 1, add t by 1; 7: end while in L t (denoted by #s i ) and observing the transition from s i to s j in L t (denoted by #(s i , s j )) using Algorithm 2. The actual transition probability P (s i , s j ) is estimated by P M (s i , s j ) = #(s i , s j )/#s i . Afterwards, we identify the transitions satisfying P M P (s i , s j ) − P M (s i , s j ) > 0 as spurious transitions and order them according to the probability deviation.
Predicate generation After we obtain a spurious transition (s i , s j ), our next step is to generate a new predicate to eliminate the spuriousness. The generated predicate is supposed to separate the concrete states of s i which transit to s j (positive instances) from those which do not (negative instances). We collect the dataset for classification in a similar way to Alg. 2 by iterating the testing log. If s i is observed, we make a decision on whether it is a positive or negative instance by telling whether its next state is s j . With the labeled dataset, we then apply a supervised classification technique in machine learning, i.e., Support Vector Machines (SVM [8, 4] ) to generate a new predicate. Then, we add the predicate for abstraction and start a new round.
Overall algorithm
The overall algorithm is shown as Alg. 3. The inputs of the algorithms are a system log L for training, a system log L t for testing, a property in the form of S ≤r (ϕ). During each iteration of the loop from line 2 to 16, we start with constructing the abstract trace based on L and a set of predicates P . The initial set of predicates for abstraction is the set of predicates in the property. Next, an abstract sDTMC M P is learned using Algorithm 1. We then verify M P against the property. If the property is verified, the system is verified and M P is presented as the evidence. Otherwise, we validate the verification result using a testing log L t at line 9. If the test passes, we report a safety violation together with the confidence. Otherwise, at line 13, we identify the most spurious transition and obtain a new predicate at line 15. After adding the new predicate into P , we restart the process from line 2. If SVM fails to find a classifier for all the spurious transitions, Alg. 3 terminates and reports the verification is unsuccessful. Otherwise, it either reports true with a supporting model or a safety violation with confidence. 
Results
In the following, we present our findings on applying the method documented in Section 3 to SWAT . Given the 11 day system log, we take the 7 day log under normal system execution and further split it into two parts for training (4 days) and testing (3 days) respectively. Note that the historian makes one record every second. The training log and testing log contains 288000 and 208800 system observations respectively. The properties we verified are whether the steady-state probability that a sensor runs out of its operating range is beyond or below a threshold. Let P train , P learn and P test be the probability that a sensor is out of operating range in the training log, learned models and the testing log respectively. In our study, we set the threshold r in each property as 20 percent larger than the probability observed in the actual system for a long time, during which the system functioned reliably. The idea is to check whether we can establish some underlying evidence to show that the system would satisfy the property indeed.
The experiment results of all sensors are summarized in Table 3 . The detailed implementation and models are available in [1]. The first column is the plant number. Column 2 and 3 are the sensors and their properties to verify which are decided by their operating ranges. The following 3 columns show the probability that a sensor value is out of operating range in the training log, learned model and the testing log respectively. Column 'result' is the verification result of the given safety properties. 'SUC' means the property is successfully verified. 'FAL' means the property is not verified. 'VIO' means the property is violated. Column 'model size' is the number of states in the learned model. Column is the parameter we use in the learning parameter. The last column gives the running time.
Summary of results
In total, we managed to verify 47 safety properties of 24 sensors. Notice that the sensor from P6 is missing in the dataset. Among them, 19 properties are never observed to be violated in the training log. We thus could not learn any models regarding these properties and conclude that the system is safe from the limited data we learn from. This is reasonable as according to the dataset, the probability violating the property is 0. For the rest 28 properties, we successfully verified 24 properties together with a learned abstract Markov chain each and reported 4 properties as safety violation with a confidence.
We have the following observations from the results. For those properties we successfully verified, we managed to learn stationary abstract Markov chains which closely approximate the steady-state probability of safety violation (evaluated based on the probability computed based on the testing log). It means that in these cases, sLAR is able to learn a model that is precise enough to capture how the sensor values change. Examples are F IT 101 > 2.6, LIT 301 > 1000, LIT 301 < 800 and LIT 401 > 1000. Besides, it can be observed that the learned abstract models are reasonably small, i.e., usually with less than 100 states and many with only a few states. This is welcomed since a smaller model is easier to comprehend and thus more meaningful for expert review or to be used as a runtime monitor. An underlying reason why a small model is able to explain why a property is satisfied is perhaps because the system is built such that the system modifies its behavior way before a safety violation is possible. Besides, we identify two groups of states which are of special interest. One of them are F IT 401 < 1.5, F IT 502 < 1.1, F IT 503 < 0.7 and F IT 504 < 0.25. The 4 properties have the same probability 0.0117 of safety violation in the training log and 0 in the testing log. We learn the same models for all of them and P learn equals 0 which is the same as the testing log. We could observe that these sensors have tight connections with each other. Moreover, these sensors are good examples that our learned models generalize from the training data and are able to capture the long run behaviors of the system with P learn equals P test , which is 0. The same goes for the other group of properties, i.e., F IT 501 < 1, P IT 501 < 20 and P IT 503 < 10.
For those properties we reported as safety violation, i.e., AIT 401 > 100, P IT 501 > 30, P IT 502 > 0.2 and P IT 503 > 20, a closer look reveals that these sensors all have high probability of violation (either 0.7156 or 0.989). Our learned models report that the probability of violation in the long term is 1, which equals the probability in the testing log in all cases. This shows that our learned models are precise even though the properties are not actually satisfied.
Discussion 1) We give a 20% margin for the safety threshold in the above experiments. In practice, the actual safety threshold could be derived from the system reliability requirement. In our experiments, we observe that we could increase the threshold to obtain a more abstract model and decrease the threshold to obtain a more detailed model. For instance, we would be more likely to verify a property with a loose threshold. 2) The parameter in the learning algorithm effectively controls the size of learned model. A small used in the model learning algorithm leads to a learned model with more states by growing a deeper tree. However, it is sometimes non-trivial to select a good [30] . In our experiment, we use 0.01 as the basic parameter. If we can not learn a model (the tree does not grow), we may choose a more strict . Examples are LIT 401 > 1000 and AIT 504 > 10. This suggests one way to improve existing model learning algorithms. 3) Each sensor has a different collection period and most of them are changing very slowly, thus the data is not all meaningful to us and we only take a data point from the dataset every minute to reduce the learning cost. However, we could learn models with higher definition by sampling the dataset more frequently.
Conclusion and Related work
In this work, we conducted a case study to automatically model and verify a fully functional water treatment system testbed. Given a set of safety properties of the system, we combine model learning and abstraction refinement to learn a model which 1) describes how the system would evolve in the long run and 2) verifies or falsifies the property. The learned models could also be used for further investigation or other system analysis tasks such as probabilistic model checking, simulation or runtime monitoring. This work is inspired by the recent trend on adopting machine learning to automatically learn models for model checking. Various kinds of model learning algorithms have been investigated including continuous-time Markov Chain [25] , DTMC [20, 9, 30, 28] and Markov Decision Process [19, 6] . In particular, this case study is closely related to the learning approach called LAR documented in [29] , which combines model learning and abstraction refinement to automatically find a proper level of abstraction to treat the problem of real-typed variables. Our algorithm is a variant of LAR, which adapts it to the setting of stationary probabilistic models [9] .
This case study aims to formally and automatically analyze a real-world CPS by modeling and verifying the physical environment probabilistically. There are several related approaches for this goal. One popular way is to model the CPS as hybrid automata [13] . In [23] , a theorem prover for hybrid systems is developed. dReach is another tool to verify the δ-complete reachability analysis of hybrid system [12] . Nevertheless, they both require users to manually write a hybrid model using differential dynamic logic, which is highly non-trivial. In [22] , the authors propose to learn hybrid models from a sample of observations. In addition, HyChecker borrows the idea of concolic testing to hybrid system based on a probabilistic abstraction of the hybrid model and achieves faster detection of counterexamples [16] . sLAR is different as it is fully automatic without relying on a user-provided model. SMC is another line of work which does not require a model beforehand [10] . However, it requires sampling the system many times. This is unrealistic for our setting since shutting down and restarting SWAT yield significant cost. Besides, SMC does not provide insight on how the system works but only provides the verification result. Our learned models however can be used for other system analysis tasks.
Several case studies are related to our case study in some way. In [18] , the authors applied integrated simulation of the physical part and the cyber part to an intelligent water distribution system. In [11] , the authors use model learning to infer models of different software components for TCP implementation and apply model checking to explore the interaction of different components. In [15] , a case study on self-driving car is conducted for the analysis of parallel scheduling for CPS. As far as we know, ours is the first on applying model learning to a real-world CPS. 
>2 0 ------<1.5 0.0117 0 0 SUC 2 0.01 37 LIT401 >1000 0.0035 0.0037 0.0034 SUC 208 0.002 455 <800 0.1227 0.123 0.079 SUC 70 0.01 2 
